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From a Roman Catholic point of view, a very stimulating
development from within Seventh-day Adventist theology has
been the work of Jean Zurcher in philosophical and theological
anthropology. In a subsequent article I hope t o elaborate an
approach to understanding the concept of immortality which
will be faithful to both Adventist and Roman Catholic
tradition, an approach which owes much to some of Zurcher's
own ideas. Here, however, by way of a preliminary essay in
this area, I would like t s offer an interpretation and appreciation of his thought. First, though, it should be noted thal just
as Zurcher's position is not an official position of the Seventhday Adventist Church, so neither am I an official spokesman
of the Roman Catholic Church. Zurcher is an anthropologist
in good standing as an Adventist. I am a theologian in equally
good standing in the Roman Catholic Church. This essay is
offered as an appreciation of Zurcher's work.
Philosophical Anth~opology
In his L'homme, sa nature et sa destinke : Essai SHYle problbme
de l'lime et du corps, Zurcher traces the history of philosophical
thought on the body-soul re1ationship.l Since this history
bears on Zurcher's own anthropology, it will be well to point
out some of its more pertinent aspects. He maintains, for
instance, that the dualism which has often been man's most
characteristic view of himself results partially, at least, from
Neuchgtel-Paris, 1953. This has been translated into English as
The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York, 1969). References will
be to the latter edition.

ANTHROPOLOGY OF ZURCHER

7I

his history of reducing himself to the status of object for the
sake of self-analysis.2 To illustrate this phenomenon, Zurcher
uses the myth of Narcissus: as a result of reflecting on himself,
man has so fallen in love with his own image that he has in
fact bestowed substantial existence to what he has come to
know :
From that moment, the subject seems to himself to be divided into
two essentially distinct spheres in one of which the "me" perceived
becomes subject while in the other the organism, instrument of
perception, becomes by essence the object. And in the extension of
this perspective the two oppositional worlds which constitute human
reality appear more and more clearly the interior world of the "me"
and the exterior world of the "not-me".3

But it is to this initial perceptive process that the dichotomistic
view of man is to be traced. This is what Zurcher refers to as
the classical error: "to have conceived man as being a body
or a spirit or an association of the two ; to have believed in the
actual existence of parts, into which our thought has divided
him, and to have regarded them as heterogeneous entities.'' *
This anthropological dichotomizing seems to reflect the
religiously dichotomistic view of nature, with its struggle
between good and evil and the forces associated with them:
light and darkness, spirit and matter, and so on. This religious
world-view was later to have its effect on Plato himself.
Zurcher traces the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of
the psyche to the ancient Greek cult of Dionysus, in which
the initiates worked themselves into a state of being with the
god, or in the god ("en-thusiasm") :
I t is precisely in this aspiration to merge the self with the god, to
lose the self in divinity, that the incipient belief in the immortality
of the soul is found. From this source Greek philosophy derived the
necessary ideas for the construction of a metaphysical doctrine of
a divine soul whose life is eternal.5

09. cit., pp. xv-xvi.
4

Ibid., pp. 92, 93.
Ibid., p. xviii.
Ibid., p. 8.
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On the other hand, in contrast to the Platonic view of man
composed of two really existing substances, body and imprisoned soul, there is the approach which Aristotle took to
the same phenomena. Where Plato tends to be analytic (and
consequently dichotomistic), Aristotle is synthetic (and tends,
therefore, toward a more unified view of man) .6
I t is intriguing for a Catholic theologian to note how
appealing to an Adventist like Zurcher is the approach of
Aristotle in this connection. Since Adventist theology
describes man so frequently in terms of soma, psyche, and
pneuma, it would be easy, though erroneous, to assume that
its option is for a trichotomistic anthropology. On the
contrary, however, Adventists describe their view of man as
"monistic" or "wholistic," and consequently close to the
Aristotelian approach to understanding the nature of man.
Zurcher himself follows Aristotle in describing the soul as
essentially creative of the body, which is its expression: the
human form, Zurcher insists, realizes itself in matter in order
that an actual being be constitued. But in order for this selfrealization to take place, of course, one must posit the action
of an efficient cause and a final cause (which, however, work
through the soul, and in a sense are contained in it, though
they transcend it). Thus, for Zurcher, the "form and matter
are one and the same thing, the one potential and the other
actual. Together, they constitute the unity of substance."
Therefore, "there is no body and no soul, but only a coexistence of two, as in the case of the wax and of the ball
which is formed from it."
A difficulty arises, however, from the fact that there is the
well-known Aristotelian distinction between the nous (the
agent intellect, which as a universal participates in the Pure
Intelligence, the Self-thinking Thought) and the psyche (the
passive intellect), which is the individual form of the body. I t is
Ibid., pp. 23-32.
Ibid., p. 25.
Ibid., p. 26.
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here that a dualism enters Aristotle's anthropology; he is never
completely able to reestablish unity, though he tries by linking
the active intellect to the sensitive soul as illuminator to the
illumined, and this in a body with each other, the image
transformed by the reality known.g
The difference between the Aristotelian view and that of
Plato is illustrated also in their respective views of death.
Plato, when he comes to speak of death, sees it as something
which has its effect only on the soma, from which the immortal
Psyche is released. This notion had its influence on Aristotle,
who, however, introduced the concept of the now as the
immortal aspect of man, the psyche being simply the vital
force of the soma, and consequently mortal. Neoplatonists
(e.g., Plotinus) see corporeal existence as death for the psyche,
with real life coming as the result of the liberation of the
psyche.1°
The early Christian philosophers were obviously influenced
by this neoplatonic outlook (with death seen as either neutral
or as a positive good). Zurcher sums up the subsequent
development :
The Christian conception of man certainly rested, in its origin, upon
a totally different anthropology. . . . But the Christian phlosophy,
founded by Clement of Alexandria and Origen, and presented by
St. Augustine in a vast system which became the doctrine of the
Church, rapidly established the pre-eminence of the fundamental
elements of the Platonic anthropology. In the Middle Ages the first
of the scholastic philosophies borrowed all its doctrine from Plotinus
and through him from Plato, while Aristotelianism triumphed with
Thomas Aquinas.
Thus, throughout nearly twenty centuries, in spite of the diversity
of succeeding systems, the various conceptions of man remain (with
trifling differences) close to that of Plato or of Aristotle: that of a
hybrid being, composed of an immortal soul and a perishable body.ll

Modern dichotomistic views, however, have another source
Ibid.,p. 31.
See Rudolf Bultmann, "Thanatos," Theological Dictionary of the
111,
New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1965)~
lo

7-14.
l1

Zurcher, o+. cit., p. 32.
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besides Greek philosophy, and Zurcher has traced them to
the very great influence of the Cartesian distinction between
the thinking-self and the being-self .l Descartes, in opposing
to the cogito a substantial existence comparable to that of
thought, passes thereby from a methodological dualism inherent
in the fact of consciousness to a substantial dualism.13 This
results, anthropologically speaking, in a thinking-substance
(the spirit) on the one hand, and a non-thinking, understood
body-substance on the other ; the body is unnecessary to the
spirit, which is self-sufficient and immortal. Descartes, however, denied being a Platonist: "The soul is not only in the
body as the pilot in the ship; it is closely joined to it and
constitutes with it a single whole." l4On the other hand, there
are many passages in his writings which conflict with his
expressed desire not to maintain a dualistic view of man.15
There is much about the fact of the union (which Descartes
arrived a t by intuition), but little about the explanation:
The Cartesian doctrine of the union of soul and body retains above
all a conspicuously contradictory and verbal character with regard
to the dualistic conception of thought and extension. The radical
incompatibility of the two contrary substances makes the third
order of things, constituted by the union of soul and body, a
chimerical being.16

As we have mentioned, Zurcher's own philosophical anthropology is basically Aristotelian, though for obvious reasons
he does not agree with Aristotle entirely, believing that the
Christian concept of the spirituality of man leads to a more
logical conclusion than that which flows from the immortality
of the soul, and which Aristotle borrowed, consciously or unconsciously, from Plato. At the basis of Zurcher's own anthropological opinion is a postulate, unity : "With Kant we believe
Ibid., pp* 37-39, 43-57Ibid., p. 39.
l4 Ibid., p. 51.
l5 Some of these are cited by Zurcher, o;b. cit., pp. 51-53.
l6 Ibid., p. 57.
l2

l3

ANTHROPOLOGY O F ZURCHER

75

that unity is actually a category of our mind, an indispensable
condition which things must satisfy in order to be grasped
by our intelligence and to penetrate into the field of consciousness.') l7 And so, anthropological unity is a necessary
condition of consciousness and comprehension.
With this postulate as the foundation, Zurcher develops his
anthropology from three distinct approaches. First, he
studies man metaphysically, that is, as human being-especially in its relationship to absolute being; then, psychologically,
in regard to human being's encounter with itself; finally,
physically, from the point of view of human being's encounter
with the other. These three points of view correspond with
Semitic anthropology with its threefold outlook on man as
spirit, soul, and body.
Ontologically, man is a participation in being according to
a particular mode-human being; and, as Zurcher points out,
by this very fact the concrete reality of a particular being
"is not simple, but composite. . . . the fact of actually being
a composite being signifies that there are in every particular
being two fundamental principles without which there would
be no particular being." One of these principles is real beingitself; the other is the limited mode-of-being. These, of course,
are not two substances existing in themselves ; rather, they
correspond to the form and matter of the categories of
Aristotle (whom he quotes with Aquinas at this point) .18
There is a second dual aspect of man, and it follows from
the fact that he is living being: man represents an essential
synthesis of two correlative principles. There is no life where
there is no being; and, conversely, when life ceases, being
ceases to exist.lg This latter point is important, with a definite
consequence for eschatology.
l7 Ibid., p. 95. We might suspect that Biblical anthropology, which
Zurcher would accept as revealed, is the basis of his postulate; but
as a philosopher, he merely postulates unity.
I s Ibid., pp. 107-109.
l9 Ibid., pp. 110-116.
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We can summarize the metaphysical data in Zurcher's own
words :

. . . he [man] is a material and spiritual being, a reasonable animal.
Man is a corporeal reality endowed with psychic life whose superior
activity has as formal object transcendental value. I n fact, all his
activity bears the seal of his physical dependency in regard to the
things which surround him. His knowledge is above all an experience,
a contact with present realities. But man is not corporeal only, he
is also spiritual; that is why this contact with the "me" in the
physical world is conscious. Man has "consciousness" of the organic
character of his activity, because the latter also reveals a spiritual
element. This is what permits the affirmation that the two constitutive principles of the metaphysical structure of man are on one
hand a material principle and on the other hand a spiritual principle.
I t is these two principles which are habitually designated by the
terms of body and soul.20
The body and soul, Zurcher insists, are integral principles,
neither of which can be defined without the other. The soul
is man; the body is man, the subsistent being. Neither can be
conceived without the other. The dead "body" is not a "body"
but a corpse; the dead "soul" does not exist.
Zurcher also analyzes man from a psycho2ogical point of
view-that is, in the act by which he himself constitutes his
own essence, for Zurcher understands, as we have seen, that
the "I" comes into existence with the consciousness:
I t is by means of consciousness that our participation in life is
realized. . . . i t is consciousness which gives us existence, for to
exist without knowing that one exists is equivalent to not being
or to being only an appearance in the consciousness of another. . . .
In reality, consciousness is not only the little invisible and vacillating
flame which lights our existence; it is our very being.21
Ibid., p. 114.
Ibid., p. 119; here Zurcher shows himself to be of the "psychometaphysical school" of Louis Lavelle, whom he frequently quotes
and who in his last work wrote: "The soul is nothing more than consciousness itself insofar as it is an aspiration toward Value" (De ZJ&me
lzumaiaze [Paris, 19511, p. 465). From this point of view, man, experiencing his freedom and capacity for creativity, proceeds from
existence to being. Here Lavelle's outlook is close to that of both Jean
Guitton and Gabriel Marcel.
20

21
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This is not, of course, the same thing as saying that consciousness caztses existence, for, "Consciousness does nothing more
than to apprehend the being, at the instant when it surges
into existence, to communicate to it in some way the identity
without which we should not recognize ourselves.
Thus, Zurcher rejects the view of "classical" philosophical
thought which he sees as envisioning a spiritual substance,
"realized even before being given to us," 23 the role of consciousness being simply, in this case, to enable us to know.
For Zurcher, consciousness is "not only inseparable from the
interior experience, which is the very condition for the
existence of the soul, but moreover, the possibility for the
existence to constitute its own essence.'' 24
But once again, the soul is not an object in itself. This
notion comes from the tendency to give the soul a role transcending that of consciousness, thereby giving the immortalsoul postulate a psychological justification. However,
"

intimate experience, far from revealing to us a transcendental soul
substance, shows us, on the contrary, a soul whose existence and
essence depend every instant on the activity of consciousness. . . .
This implies that the soul and consciousness are inseparable and
that there is the closest affinity between them. I t is absolutely
impossible to conceive of one without the other . . . 25
"

Zurcher prefers to think of the soul, then, as being an existence
rather than as having an existence, "since it is precisely the
power that we have of making ourselves. . . . The essence
of the soul is, thus, never a constituted essence, but an essence
which constitutes itself throughout the duration of an
existence. 26 And so, in identifying the soul and consciousness,
"

Ibid., p. 120.
Ibid., p. 122.
2 4 Ibid., p. 123.
2 5 Ibid., p. 124; this, of course, raises the question "whether this
personal consciousness is capable of persisting after the dissolution
of the bodily organism9'-W. R. Matthews, "The Destiny of the Soul,"
The Hibbert Journal, XXVIII (January, 1930), 193.
26 Zurcher, op. cit., p. 125.
22

23
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and consciousness with the self, he is saying that the soul is
this self in process and that it (the soul/self) ceases to exist
when consciousness ceases : "the soul is man in a way creating
himself every day of his life. . . . The soul is . . . synonymous
with man, or inversely, man is synonymous with the soul." 2 7
The application for the question of self-knowledge, then, is
that self-knowledge "is not to discover an object which is
the self; it is, rather, to awaken in oneself a hidden life,
the life of conscience." 28
To sum up this psychological view of man as a soul, Zurcher
has this to say :
If . . . we wished to give a precise definition of the soul insofar as
it is the spiritual essence of man, we should simply say that it
occurs
. where the consciousness of self is allied to the capacity
of self determination.2 9

..

Thus, freedom is an essential constitutent of human being, an
aspect of human personality which results from conscious
existence. These are aspects of man as a living soul.
Finally, Zurcher considers man's exterior self-manifestation
as he discusses the cor~orealreality of man. His main point
is to insist that body and soul are elements constitutive of
man: corporeal and spiritual principles. Actually, as he
indicates, the word "spirit" is better used to describe the
soul as a spiritual principle, thus making it possible to distinguish between the corporeal, psychic, and spiritual life of the
individual.30
He does not, however, want to move from a Cartesian
dichotomy to a trichotomy of more or less heterogeneous
substances. The body, for Zurcher, constitutes the normal
mode of expression of the individual: "it is not only the
2 7 Ibid., p. 127.
z8 Ibid., p. 128; furthermore, "the birth into a new life-which is
the Christian revelation fiar excellence-is . . . the birth of the life of
the conscience."
2 9 Ibid., p. 129.
3 0 Ibid., p. 137.
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evidence of our existence, the expression of our affective life,
but also the vehicle of all the movements of our thought.'' 31
The spirit is related to both body and soul, for as he points
out, since the incarnation, "the spirit is no farther from the
body than the soul, and the soul is not more spiritual than the
body." 32 Zurcher also emphasizes the fact that the bodymanifestation
can never be separated from the power which it expresses, since
the means by which the soul realizes itself is also the means by which
it expresses itself. . . . In short, expression is so essential to the
existence of the soul that the soul actually exists only to the extent
that it gives to itself a body.33

Theological Anthropology
At this point there arises a question which remains unsolved in any purely philosophical approach to anthropology :
that of the essential difference between man and the animal.
Is it merely a question of degree of consciousness (and thus
of personality and freedom) ? From the Biblical point of view,
there is no essential difference on the level of the constitutive
elements of man and animal-both are living creatures in
the sense of Gn 2 :7-and life is life. What difference there is
arises from the creation of man in the image of God. Man is
destined for personal relationship with God, and consequently
there exists "in" man a point of contact between God and
man which does not characterize the relationship between
God and animals. This "image" is understood in contemporary
Adventist theology in terms of certain capacities possessed
by man but not by animals: the capacity to reason, the
emotional capacities analyzed by psychology (even some sort
of physical relationship-although this is a vague area). But
the apex of these capacities, and the key to any genuinely
theological anthropology , is man's capacity for spiritual fellow-
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ship with God. This pneumatic level is the level a t which the
fellowship achieved in regeneration is reached.
I t is quite clear, therefore, that it is impossible to develop
an adequate doctrine of the nature of man (especially in an
eschatological perspective) without speaking of the destiny
given man a t his creation. As Zurcher points out in the last
part of his book, "the desire for immortality is found rooted
in the depths of human nature." 34 This .~zaturaldesire (although
he does not use this classical term of scholastic philosophy)
he considers the strongest proof for the fact of man's being
destined for immortality. We should not, however, think of
this deeply-rooted desire as simply a static phenomenon
extrinsic to man, which will be fulfilled eventually in the world
to come. Rather, since in Zurcher's view the nature of man
has been identified with his freedom, he can achieve this
destiny in the process of exercising this freedom throughout
the duration of his existence.
In considering man's nature as very much bound up with
his destiny, Zurcher insists that he is treating man "existentially"-i.e.,
in his situation before God-and at the same
time is returning to the Biblical and Christian view of man.
He thus expresses the harmony between Biblical anthropology
and the existentialist anthropology of contemporary theology.
He stresses the monistic character of the former: it presents
man as a perfect and indissoluble unity of body, soul, and
spirit; and he sees the accent on this unity underlying the
essence of Christianity :
When Christ speaks of the manifestations of our love to God and to
our neighbor, the accent is not placed on the multiplicity of its
possible manifestations-which vary, moreover, from one Gospel to
another-but rather on the fact that each of them should be the most
complete expression of the totality of the being. "Thou shalt love
34 Ibid., p. 147;he goes back to this idea later: "It is not necessary
to search very long for the conclusion that the destiny of man is found
entirely inscribed in the metaphysical structure of his being" (ibid.,
P. 165).
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the Lord thy God with all thine heart, with all thy soul, with all thy
strength and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself."a6

This monistic character is also in accord with the two key
passages for Biblical anthropology :
The Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed
into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being
(Gn 2:7).
May the God of peace himself sanctify you wholly; and may your
spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless a t the coming
of the Lord Jesus Christ ( I Th 5 :23).

In both of these passages the unity of man's nature comes
through. In the latter passage it might seem that Paul has a
quite trichotomistic view of man; that this is not so is clear
from the fact that Paul's other letters indicate that his anthropology is essentially Biblical. For instance, in I Cor 15 :45, he
even refers to Gn 2:7: "Thus it is written, 'The first man
Adam became a living being'; the last Adam became a lifegiving spirit." Thus, the spirit, soul, and body are aspects of
man's being-for-communion with God. And, "even if the
manifestations of the being are manifold and very different,
depending on whether they are made by the body, the soul
or the spirit, they imply every time the whole man in a certain
expression of himself." 36
With this monistic stress as background, let us now turn
to an analysis of Zurcher's theological view of the soma-psychep n e ~ m arelationship.
In his comments on the concept of soma, he maintains that
corporeality is an essential presupposition for the self-expression of the human person in his relationship with God.
Referring to Bultmann, he states that "there is no human
existence, no human reality even in the sphere of pneuma,
the mind, which is not corporeal, somatic," and any attempt
as
S6

"The Christian View of Man: Part One," A USS, I1 (1964), 159.
I b ~ d . pp.
,
159, 160.
6
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to separate the two is ultimately destructive of man himself.37
He points out that those cases in which individuals in the Bible
speak of "my body" or "my soul" 38 are examples of man's
psychological capacity to objectify his experiences, without
which capacity human knowledge could not exist. This
phenomenon is no proof of the substantial existence of a body
and a soul in an adequate distinction from each other.
In his discussion of the Biblical concept of psyche (with its
Hebrew background of nephesh), Zurcher indicates the
essential corporeality of this concept. It "designates the
individualized life in a physiological sense [Gn 35 :181, as well
as in a psychological one [I Sa I : 101. " . . . the idea of psuchd
embraces the total man, the entire human personality, the
individual being in his perfect unity." 39
I n regard to the immortality of the soul, he repeats his
contention that the soul is not one of the constituent elements
of man, but rather man himself. Therefore, he reasons, the
soul cannot be said to be immortal unless man can be said to
be immortal. Man, however, is constituted by the union of
matter and spirit, and the resulting "soul exists only insofar
as man has consciousness of being." Perhaps if we identify
"soul" with the "spirit" in man, we can speak of the separation
of soul and body at death; but if so, we must remember, he
says, that man as such dies (ceases to exist in the sense we
have distinguished above) with their s e ~ a r a t i o n . ~ ~
From this point of view, of course, death is a tremendous
threat to man-it is not simply the death of the body, but of
the man. Death, then, is not a mere change of dwelling, but a
real death, that is to say, the cessation of life under all its
forms, of conscious and psychic as well as corporeal life.41
All must die because all have sinned. The gospel does offer man
3 7 Ibid., pp. 160, 162;see also Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the
New Testament (New York, 1951),I, 192.
88 For example, Mt 26:38;Jn 12:27;I Cor Z:II;
9:27.
S 9 Zurcher, "The Christian View of Man: Part One," pp. 163,164.
40 The Nature and Destiny of Man, p. 165.
Ibid., p. 167.
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deliverance from death, but not in the Platonic sense. Rather,
Christianity "offers immortality only to the man who is freed
from the law of sin by the Spirit of life which is Jesus Christ." 42
There is even then, "no immortality whatever . . . inherent
in human nature but life eternal is for him who grasps it by
faith and fashions his soul in the image of Jesus Christ." 43
The destiny of man is bound up with the necessity for the
body-soul entity we call man to become more "spiritual,"
that is, to become more configured to the image of Jesus
Christ, the second Adam, the life-giving Spirit. This is what
the Bible looks forward to for the soma, which is not a corpse,
but the corporeal manifestation of the living man. The
material body will be raised, but it will be pneumatikon,
totally under the dominion of man's spirit responsive to the
Holy Spirit.
Zurcher's treatment of the concept of the pneuma of man
identifies it with the "complete manifestation of man in
spiritual or intellectual form." He states that "Paul. . . uses
pneuma in the sense of nous, intellect," and maintains that,
"when it signifies the human spirit, pneuma probably always
has this sense. I t then designates the manifestations of the
intelligent being who 'knows,' who 'comprehends,' who
'decides' [Php 4 :7 ; I Cor 14: 14-19; Rom 7 :23 ; 14:51." But
again, Zurcher insists, this is not the Greek philosophical
sense of a disembodied spirit : "No more thanpsuchd orpneuma
is nous ever opposed to s6ma; now is indeed unthinkable
without sdma. For the human personality of which they are
the manifestation has been created nous and sdma." 44
Having discussed from a theological point of view the
constitution of man as he is in himself, we turn to that of man
in his relationship to God. Zurcher would, of course, maintain
that a genuine Christian anthropology views man as having
existence only in relationship to God his Creator. As he puts
42

Ibid.

44

Ibid., p. 169.
"The Christian View of Man: Part One," pp. 164, 165.
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it, "creation signifies . . . that while there exists a reality
different from God, it does not exist in itself, but only through
God." 45 Thus, there is no dichotomy here, either. Dependence
is an aspect of creaturely existence, and a creature is a "being
continually menaced by the possibility-excluded by God and
by God alone--of nothingness and of win." 46 And this creation, this creaturely existence, is fundamentally good:
What is not good God did not make; i t has no creaturely existence.
But if being is to be ascribed to it a t all, and we would rather not say
that it is non-existent, then it is only the power of the being which
arises out of the weight of the divine "No." 4 7

Besides the creaturely, there is a second aspect of man's
relationship to God: his existence as the image of God. Zurcher
sees this as consisting, first, in man's function as representative
of God on earth, as an expression of his real presence (Gn I :26 ;
Ps 8 :6-7). But this involves also a responsibility towards God,
which Zurcher situates in the context of obedience to the
divine will-the area of decision. I t is here that the freedom
of man "permits him to think and to act, to accept or to refuse
Being." 4 8
There is a third aspect of man's existence in relationship
to God: his existence as a s i ~ z n eI ~t is. ~in~this connection that
the Biblical notion of sarx must be discussed. The temptation
to sin, Zurcher points out, is not the result of a body-soul
dichotomy, but because of the conflict between "the law of
the mind" and the "law of sin." Because of the moral history
of humanity, man is not entirely free in making his decision.
"The Christian View of Man: Part Two," A U S S , I11 (1965), 67.
Ibid., p. 68.
4' Karl Barth, Dogmatics i n Outline (New York, 1959). p. 57,
quoted by Zurcher, ibid., p. 70.
4 8 Zurcher, A U S S , I11 (1965), 70-73. Here, however, Zurcher seems
to imply that the decision to accept or refuse "Being" is the same thing
as to accept or refuse "being." At this point we get into the problem of
the relationship between Being and being, which, though vital, we
cannot treat here. See John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (New York, 1966), pp. 105-110.
4 9 See Zurcher, "The Christian View of Man: Part Two," pp. 74-83.
45

46
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A distinction must, of course, be made between sin and flesh;
because of the existential situation of sarx, they are connected
but not identical: "It is evident that the flesh is neither an
evil substance nor . . . is it incarnate sin," says Zur~her.~O
Yet the carnal state is de facto a state of powerlessness before
the power of sin; and Adventist theology is not idealistic:
[The] carnal reality of man is the first revelation of Christian anthropology. . . . A mysterious power makes man a slave of the "law
of sin" incapable of submitting to "the law of God" even though
he takes pleasure in it. . . . Such is the tragic situation of nature
man, left to himself. He is a dead man who does not know true
life, because he is a servant of forces contrary to life.61

Having discussed Zurcher's theology of man's nature and
relationship to God as creature, image, and sinner, we come
to his thinking on the relationship of Jesus Christ precisely
as life-giving Spirit, to the p n e ~ m aof man in its state as sarx,
or powerlessness. As Zurcher has indicated: by the work of
Christ the Spirit of God has become an effective anthropological reality, "because it communicates to man the power of
becoming a child of God, first in freeing him from sIavery to
sin and then in causing him truly to participate in the nature
of God." Ei2
Zurcher connects at least some aspect of dichotomistic
thinking about man to dichotomistic thinking about the
central mystery of Christianity, the redemptive incarnation.
The fact, however, remains that the Word became sarx, not
"in order to oppose human nature as such and to destroy it,
but rather to free it from the power of sin, to sanctify it and
to restore it to its original perfection." 53 The Son, by uniting
himself to humanity, has made of his Spirit the fundamental
Christian Spirit, and thus a vital factor of Christian anthropology. From this point of view, also, there can be no dichotomy in Christian anthropology:
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The spirit speaks to the whole man and solicitshis total participation.
To the extent that He is in man, the Spirit acts. He creates and His
action is manifested in the whole being: mind, soul, and body.
This action begins by the renewing of the intelligence. After having
been led captive to the obedience of Christ, then transformed by the
knowledge of the Saviour, the intelligence becomes capable of
discerning the will of God, . . . From that moment nothing further
escapes the sanctifying action of the Spirit; the thoughts, the
feelings and the desires, are all purified. The body itself becomes the
temple of the Spirit.&*

Linking this fact with that of man's constitution as image of
God, Zurcher sees the relationship implied in the image as
characterized now by a new dynamic, that of the call of the
Spirit in man's life (Rom 8 :16 ;g :I) : "As soon as man responds
to the call of God, to the witness of the Spirit, the rupture
between God and man is no more, . . . the power of sin no
longer has an unshakable hold on him."55 Hence, the apparent
dichotomy between the Holy Spirit and the flesh is overcome
by the power of the Spirit in dialogue with the free spirit of
man, which is strengthened by this contact to overcome the
tensions with its own sarx-aspect: "Though the conflict
between sarx and pnezlma is real, it is a conflict in which the
spirit t r i ~ r n p h s . "Thus
~ ~ man enters into new life according
to the Spirit, a life-in-process, looking forward to the attainment of the perfection of Christ himself.
I t seems, therefore, clear that Zurcher's phenomenological
approach to the mystery which is man is in striking harmony
with the Biblical intuition based on God's people's experience
of itself in its concrete, historical relationship with God. What,
moreover, makes it interesting to a non-Adventist is its
openness to the interpretations of man emerging in many continental theologies. This fact offers the possibility of greater
mutual understanding between other Christians and Adventists on the issue of man's immortality. This issue is rooted
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in the question : what is man ? Zurcher, as we have seen, views
consciousness as the constitutive factor of h z m a n being; and
here he is consistent with the Aristotelian concept of the nous
as the distinctive element of man; since Zurcher denies the
natural immortality of man, he would say that there can be
(naturally) no noetic existence after death. This, however,
reduces death to a "state" of non-existence-which, it would
appear, fails to bear witness to the fact that the just man now
participates in eternal life, the victory of Christ over death-a
participation which would not take place until the second
advent of Christ.
How can we speak of the "existence" of man after death?
Karl Barth has expressed our faith-reaction:
If he, the Lord of death, our gracious God, the ineffable sum of all
goodness, is present with us even in death, then obviously in the
midst of death we are not only in death but already out of its
clutches and victorious over it, not of ourselves but of God. We die,
but He lives for us. Even in death we are not lost to Him, and therefore we are not really lost. . . . Hence our future non-existence cannot
be our complete negation. 5 7

The response that the just exist in the mind of God might seem
not very helpful, but it would appear to be a possible startingpoint rather than a dead-end, for, as Josiah Royce has phrased
If God is God, he views the future and the past as we do the present.
. . What has, for us men, passed away, is, for the divine omniscience,
not lost. . . . if God views facts as they are, this indeed implies
that death, . cannot . . . be . . . an absolutely real loss to reality
of values which, but for death, would not become thus ~ n r e a l . ~ 8

.

..

Exploring the question via the route taken by Zurcher, that
of theological anthropology, would a t least be to take a new
approach to the problem. But this is a subject for another
article.
5 7 Chu~chDogmatics, ed. G. W . Bromiley and T. F. Torrance
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